# WhiteFin Execution Proof Objects and RFC-0509

*Public Mapping Summary v1.0 — Published*

Joint bilateral technical mapping between 3PMobile and WhiteFin.



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| **Document status** | Published v1.0 |
| **Derived from** | WhiteFin Execution Proof Objects as RFC-0509 Proof-Side Presentment Candidates — Controlled Mapping Note v0.3 — Settled |
| **Methodology** | Public Mapping Summary Methodology v1.0 — Approved |
| **Mapped object** | Selected WhiteFin execution-proof objects and supporting verification materials |
| **Scope** | Public-safe proof-side presentment classification only |
| **Distribution** | Public distribution through the approved 3PMobile canonical reference page and WhiteFin reciprocal reference page, subject to the completed Publication Authorization and matching SHA-256 record. |
| **Approval posture** | Governed by the bilateral Publication Authorization. Public release occurs only after matching SHA-256 confirmation and explicit written authorization by both parties. |

## 1. Purpose

This document summarizes the completed RFC-0509 controlled mapping of selected WhiteFin execution-proof objects. Its purpose is to communicate, in public-safe language, what the mapping demonstrated, why the result matters to the broader receiving-boundary problem, and what the mapping expressly did not conclude.

It is derived from the settled Controlled Mapping Note. It does not replace that note and does not introduce additional technical conclusions.

## 2. Objective

The mapping examined whether selected WhiteFin execution-proof objects can be described using the public concepts of the RFC-0509 Receiving-Boundary Reliance Grammar.

The exercise focused on proof-side presentment only.

It did not evaluate receiver-side requirements, local reliance formation, implementation architecture, operational deployment, or commercial suitability.

## 3. What Was Mapped

The controlled exercise reviewed representative WhiteFin execution-proof objects together with supporting verification materials supplied for the mapping.

The review considered:

- object structure;
- deterministic verification behaviour;
- execution-history representation;
- disclosed schemas;
- supplied verification materials;
- attribute verification classes; and
- associated technical correspondence required to interpret the reviewed evidence.

The mapping was bounded to the reviewed evidence set.

## 4. What the Exercise Demonstrated

The controlled mapping demonstrated that the reviewed WhiteFin execution-proof objects can be expressed as RFC-0509 proof-side presentment candidates.

The exercise preserved important distinctions between:

- proof-side presentment and receiver-side reliance;
- object-verifiable attributes and attested operational posture;
- deterministic verification and external correspondence; and
- commitment integrity and receiver-local consequence.

The exercise also illustrates how the RFC-0509 grammar is designed to describe heterogeneous proof objects without requiring proof systems to adopt a common proof format or implementation model.

## 5. Why It Matters

Modern ecosystems increasingly exchange proof generated by independently developed systems. Those proof objects differ in structure, verification models, and implementation choices.

RFC-0509 is designed to provide a neutral receiving-boundary grammar for heterogeneous proof objects without requiring a universal proof object or transferring receiver authority to the proof producer. The WhiteFin mapping provides one concrete example of how a proof-side object can be described within that grammar while preserving receiver sovereignty.

This supports interoperability at the receiving boundary.

## 6. What Was Not Concluded

The mapping does not establish or state:

- certification or endorsement of WhiteFin;
- RFC-0509 profile approval or standards-body approval;
- receiver-side conformance;
- receiver-side reliance;
- production deployment, production correctness, or operational maturity;
- organic traffic, customer activity, or customer deployment;
- any statement that the reviewed objects are complete, current, authoritative, or sufficient for any receiver consequence;
- authority, legal effect, settlement, liability allocation, or consequence;
- universal or transitive reliance;
- commercial partnership, exclusivity, integration, or mark permission; or
- approval of future WhiteFin versions, future deployments, or unreviewed capabilities.
- disclosure or evaluation of any protected 3PMobile operating-layer mechanism.

The mapping is limited to the reviewed proof-side materials and the classifications established in the settled Controlled Mapping Note.

Mechanical verification of supplied objects does not demonstrate production deployment, organic traffic, customer activity, or operational behaviour outside the reviewed evidence boundary.

Rules, canonicalization procedures, normalization logic, or other materials supplied only within the bilateral technical review remain subject to their original disclosure scope and are not implied to be publicly available.

## 7. Conclusion

This mapping demonstrates that the reviewed WhiteFin execution-proof objects can be described accurately using the public RFC-0509 Receiving-Boundary Reliance Grammar while preserving the distinction between proof creation and receiver-local reliance.

RFC-0509 is designed to express heterogeneous proof systems through a common receiving-boundary vocabulary without reducing receiver sovereignty or requiring a universal proof object. The WhiteFin mapping is one concrete proof-side example within that design.

The result contributes to the broader interoperability objective addressed by RFC-0509 while remaining bounded to the reviewed evidence and preserving the technical and publication boundaries established during the controlled mapping process.